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Shifting Welfare Policy Positions: The Impact of Radical Right
Populist Party Success Beyond Migration Politics
Werner Krause and Heiko Giebler
WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
Political parties respond strategically to the electoral success of
radical right populist parties (RRPPs). While previous research has
focused on programmatic responses on cultural conﬂict issues, we
are expanding the research on policy position adaption to the
economic left-right issue of welfare-state politics. Actual and
potential supporters of RRPPs do not only feel threatened by
migration or liberal conceptions of society but are also often
confronted with real or perceived socio-economic decline.
Therefore, we argue that established parties do not only react by
changing their socio-cultural policy oﬀers but also by adjusting
their welfare state policy positions. Based on parties’ voter
potentials and issue ownership theory, we investigate whether
such changes are especially pronounced for left-of-center parties.
Analysing data from 18 West European countries since 1985, we
ﬁnd that non-RRPPs indeed advocate more leftist positions on
welfare state policies in response to increasing electoral support
for RRPPs. This eﬀect is especially pronounced for economically
left-of-centre parties as these parties might consider this to be a
promising strategy to win back voters from the populist radical right.
KEYWORDS
Radical right populist parties;
party competition; welfare;
party positions; left-right
Introduction
The ongoing success of radical right populist parties (RRPPs)1 is not only of major interest
in scientiﬁc and public discourse, but – presumably – has a substantial impact on various
relevant aspects of the functioning of democracies. On the one hand, some scholars con-
clude that RRPPs ﬁll representational gaps, advocate the people’s sovereignty, or mobilise
citizens to vote (Ivarsﬂaten, 2008; Kriesi, 2014; Mouﬀe, 2005). On the other hand, the
majority of evaluations identify dysfunctional consequences: the erosion of liberal democ-
racy and open society as well as a transformation of political debates from fact- to
emotion-driven discourses promoting scapegoating and over-simpliﬁcation and under-
mining the legitimacy of representative democracy in general (Abts & Rummens, 2007;
Mudde, 2007; Müller, 2016). In this paper, we investigate RRPPs’ impact in a more
direct way, looking at what is at the heart of many of the eﬀects mentioned above. We
examine how these parties inﬂuence the political positioning of non-RRPPs on the tra-
ditional socio-economic issue dimension. More speciﬁcally, we investigate reactions
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regarding welfare-state issues – one of the core topics of the socio-economic left-right
dimension. Expanding Mudde’s (2004) assessment, the populist zeitgeist is not only
inﬁltrating mainstream politics but also changing political competition, which has a
major impact on the functioning of representative democracy in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
There are already several studies on the impact of RRPPs on political competition and
policy positions of non-RRPPs – especially concerning mainstream parties (Abou-Chadi,
2016; Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018; Han, 2015; van Spanje, 2010). With only a few excep-
tions (Meijers, 2017; Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016), these studies focus on pos-
itional shifts and strategies related to RRPPs’ core issues of cultural protectionism.
While the results of these studies in the realm of ‘New Politics’ are conclusive (Muis &
Immerzeel, 2017, p. 918), the overall picture remains incomplete as the underlying
notions of political competition are oversimpliﬁed. Even though the cultural conﬂict
dimension has become much more important in recent decades and despite the fact
that many political platforms of RRPPs are mainly concerned with cultural issues, it is
still not the only game in town.
Economic issues remain one of the cornerstones of political debate and election cam-
paigns in Western democracies. Policy areas such as welfare, education, and labour rights
continue to represent critical political divides. In this context, RRPPs increasingly cater to
the needs of ‘ordinary people’ by highlighting an alleged malfunctioning of states’ welfare
systems caused by the inﬂux of foreign populations (Fennema, 2005, pp. 10–11; Mudde,
2007, pp. 119–124). Some RRPPs have also managed to gain considerable electoral
support among socio-economically disadvantaged groups and parts of the electorate
who fear personal economic downturns. Given that the populist radical right is continu-
ously attracting strata of the electorate whose primary vote decision in the past was at least
in part framed in leftist economic terms, promoting pro-welfare positions constitutes a
promising programmatic strategy to prevent future vote loss and to win back (economi-
cally deprived or concerned) voters from an RRP competitor. While we already know that
parties respond to the success of RRPPs by taking up more authoritarian positions (see e.g.
Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018; van Spanje, 2010), we argue that the same should apply to
more pro-welfare positions. By expanding the foci of earlier studies concerned with
RRPP success and their impact on party competition regarding welfare (Röth, Afonso,
& Spies, 2018; Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016), we argue that promoting pro-
welfare stances constitutes a plausible strategic response from RRPPs’ competitors.
However, a pro-welfare-state response should also depend on the ideological proﬁle of
the political party in question. Left-of-centre parties are likely to own issues such as welfare
and social justice. They are therefore especially threatened by RRPPs’ attraction of socio-
economically disadvantaged voter groups and have a direct incentive to put forward pro-
welfare stances in order to challenge RRPPs’ claim to defend the interests of these groups.
In contrast, right-of-centre parties predominantly compete with RRPPs for culturally
authoritarian voters. Hence, we argue that Conservatives and Liberals will opt for a less
pronounced pro-welfare response to RRPP success than left-of-centre parties.
Based on data provided by the MARPOR group (Volkens et al., 2018), we investigate
the eﬀect of RRPP vote share on the positions of non-RRPPs on welfare-related issues.
We do so by analysing 670 party manifestos in 18 Western European countries since
1985 in a time-series cross-section framework. The results show that non-RRPPs
promote more leftist positions on welfare when challenged by RRPPs. This eﬀect is not
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limited to mainstream parties. We also ﬁnd that this eﬀect is primarily driven by left-of-
centre parties. These ﬁndings underline that RRPPs’ impact on party competition is more
profound than assumed in the current discourse. While non-RRPPs have been found to
modify their stances on immigration, this study reveals that political parties are also
adjusting their programmatic strategies on the economic conﬂict dimension. The
impact of RRPPs on Western European politics thus goes well beyond the realm of
migration politics and this study constitutes an important step towards a more compre-
hensive research agenda investigating changing patterns of political competition but
also the impact of RRPPs on representative democracy.
State of the art: The programmatic impact of radical right populist parties
on their competitors
Previous studies have repeatedly found that political parties respond to the electoral
success of RRPPs. This is consistent with more general research on policy adjustments
by parties (e.g. Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009). First and foremost, mainstream parties
from the right and left adjust their positions on issues related to cultural protectionism
by shifting toward the rightist pole of this conﬂict dimension. The rationale behind this
accommodative strategy (Meguid, 2008) is to send a signal to the public that mainstream
parties are (now) seriously committed to this issue. In the process, mainstream parties
expect not only to prevent future vote loss but also to regain votes previously lost to chal-
lengers from the far right. This strategy is assumed to work due to mainstream parties’
higher chances of government participation and the actual implementation of more rig-
orous migration and integration policies. Although some studies cast doubt on this con-
tagious eﬀect of the radical right (see Mudde, 2013 for an overview), the majority of
comparative large-n studies ﬁnd empirical support for this relationship (Abou-Chadi,
2016; Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018; Han, 2015; van Spanje, 2010).
All these studies do not investigate whether RRPPs have contagious eﬀects beyond their
core issues, i.e. immigration and integration. This lack of research is surprising since at
least two dimensions of conﬂict structure political competition in Western Europe
(Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2012): a traditional economic left-right dimension and a cul-
tural ‘New Politics’ or GAL-TAN dimension (Hooghe, Marks, &Wilson, 2002).2 Although
the latter (cultural) issues have gained importance since the late 1970s (Inglehart, 1977),
economic issues remain crucial in Western European societies. Policy areas such as
welfare, education, and labour rights continue to represent critical political divides that
determine voters’ choices and structure the parties’ programmatic strategies. As a conse-
quence, the success of RRPPs can be described not only in terms of cultural divides but
also (at least in part) in socio-economic terms. While it is true that anti-immigrant atti-
tudes unite voters of RRPPs across Western Europe (van der Brug & Fennema, 2003),
we also see a divide between losers and winners of globalisation when it comes to
voting for the radical right (Kriesi et al., 2012). Thus, the programmatic responses of
non-RRPPs should thus not be limited to the cultural issue domain.
Only few studies investigated eﬀects that go beyond RRPPs’ cultural core issues. For
example, Meijers (2017) found a contagious eﬀect of radical right populist parties on
the positions of mainstream parties regarding European integration, which, however,
cannot be completely separated from the cultural dimension of political competition
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when looking at the radical right (e.g. Mudde, 2007: chapter 7). With regard to the econ-
omic dimension, Röth et al. (2018) develop a mixed-method design and apply it to 17
Western European countries. They show that governments that include an RRPP tend
to be less supportive of market deregulation than right-wing governments without
RRPP participation. At the same time, they back away from advocating welfare-state
retrenchment – against the policy preferences of their primarily market-liberal coalition
partners. While our paper does not focus on the policy consequences of RRPP’s electoral
success, but on the consequences for spatial competition, Röth et al.’s study is nevertheless
of great importance for our argument. By oﬀering a defence of the welfare state, RRPPs
clearly put some emphasis on the economic dimension, thereby competing with other
parties for voters and policies (e.g. welfare state conservation vs. welfare state
retrenchment).
Even more closely related to our study, Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2016) asked
whether and howmainstream parties in eight West European countries respond program-
matically to successful RRPPs that hold welfare-chauvinist positions. They ﬁnd that
increasingly welfare-chauvinist positions of RRPPs are associated with mainstream
parties becoming less supportive of multiculturalism and that only mainstream parties
on the right adjust their position on the welfare state to a more pro-welfare stance.
Although their study is insightful and sheds ﬁrst (empirical) light on the impact of
RRPPs on the economic conﬂict dimension, it leaves room for improvement. For
example, the authors looked for positional changes of mainstream parties as a result of
RRPPs’ policy oﬀers regarding welfare-chauvinism. As we argue below, this implies at
least two unnecessary restrictions: First, RRPPs do not only compete with mainstream
parties, especially when it comes to the economic dimension. Second, and more impor-
tantly, building on existing research on RRPP voter proﬁles and electoral competition,
we present several arguments in support of examining whether RRPPs inﬂuence the
welfare positions of established parties even if pro-welfare stances are not central to the
programmatic appeals of RRPPs. The latter not only broadens the perspective, but also
allows us to stick to more established and convincing measures of party positions.3
All in all, we contribute to the broader literature by explicitly focusing on the economic
dimension and going beyond the limits of policy implementation, but focusing on party
competition, for which RRPPs play a much greater role than in the rare cases where
they have been part of government. In addition, we argue that the impact of RRPPs is
not limited to reactions of mainstream parties, but also aﬀects smaller challenger
parties. As far as these reactions are concerned, our approach is not limited to program-
matic adjustments in the area of welfare chauvinism, but we look at welfare policy pos-
itions in general. Finally, we claim that these eﬀects are not based on the actual policy
positions of RRPPs on economic issues – i.e. the support for pro-welfare measures –
but on the composition of their voters. We thus provide a more general framework –
both, in terms of the theoretical argument and empirical analysis.
Radical right populist party success and the welfare issue
In manyWestern democracies, RRPPs have been electorally successful for quite some time
– including some late-comers such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD – Alternative
for Germany) or recent large-scale vote increases of parties like the Italian Lega Nord
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(Northern League) or the Swedish Democrats. These vote gains are to the detriment of
leftist and rightist rival parties. While there are diﬀerences between countries and contexts,
political parties of very diﬀerent origins come under pressure. Satisfying current voters
and, ideally, winning (back) voters from other parties is of utmost importance for
parties, whether they primarily seek oﬃce or policy. While not guaranteeing success,
adjusting policy positions constitutes one possible strategy to maximise votes.4
Figure 1 shows a substantial overlap in the competition for votes between RRPPs, econ-
omic left-of-centre, and economic right-of-centre parties in Western Europe. Based on
data provided by the 2014 European Election Study (Schmitt, Hobolt, Popa, & Teperoglou,
2016), we see the shares of voters considering voting for these three party families. Not
surprisingly, the overlap of available voters (Kroh, van der Brug, & van der Eijk, 2007;
Wagner, 2017) is greatest between left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties. We also see
a signiﬁcant overlap in the electoral availability between non-RRPPs and RRPPs.5
About 10.2% of respondents are potential supporters of a left-wing party as well as an
RRPP, while the value for an overlap of a non-RRPP right-wing party with an RRPP is
slightly lower. All three party groups have a common pool of available voters of about
6.7%. While this is primarily an illustration, it does speak in favour of electoral compe-
tition with RRPPs of both economically left-wing as well as right-wing parties,
Figure 1. Overlapping voter pools between radical right, economic left-of-centre and economic right-
of-centre parties.
Note: The ﬁgure shows European averages based on national percentages (weighted data).
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encouraging both latter groups of parties to adjust their policy positions to attract voters
from these overlapping voter pools.
The success of RRPPs depends to a large extent on their attractiveness for the so-called
‘losers of globalisation.’ These citizens feel or are threatened by international economic
competition (Rooduijn 2015), which leads, for example, to anti-immigration stances.
However, these voters should also be inclined to support more generous welfare-state pol-
icies as this group either faces or ist at risk of a downward trend in its socio-economic
status due to globalisation. The importance of economic issues for these voters can be
directly deduced from the programmatic positions of RRPPs. From the viewpoint of
RRPPs, the functioning of Western European social security and welfare systems is threa-
tened by the alleged excessive inﬂux of foreign populations (Rydgren, 2008). The populist
far right thus presents measures against immigration as a legitimate defence of the social
gains and welfare of the indigenous population (Betz & Johnson, 2004). As Schumacher
and van Kersbergen (2016) point out, anti-immigrant and xenophobic attitudes are some-
times associated with economically leftist positions, resulting in welfare chauvinism.
However, by placing more emphasis on the populist character of these parties, we argue
that such a connection is not necessary for theoretizising the relevance of welfare positions
to RRPPs. While several RRPPs have campaigned on right-wing economic demands in the
past – especially regarding tax policies – many of them have moderated their positions
since the 1980s (e.g. Rydgren 2013, p. 4). In recent decades Western European countries
have seen a relatively uniform development towards welfare-state retrenchment – pro-
moted by established rightist and leftist parties. The adaptation of Kitschelt’s (1995, p.
21) argument that RRPPs were originally against the welfare state, as this represented
an anti-establishment position in times of retrenchment, criticising welfare-state retrench-
ment has nowadays the potential of becoming a new populist, anti-establishment position
(see also Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016). Thus, RRPPs can directly link the opposi-
tion to welfare-state retrenchement to their populist character.
Switching from the supply to the demand side, most of the successful radical right
parties have seen a proletarianisation of their electorate (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006;
Rydgren, 2008), leading to a ‘new pattern of class-voting in Western Europe’ (Arzheimer,
2013, p. 79). RRPPs have attracted large numbers of voters from the lower and working
classes. Although these voters may be driven by cultural factors related to globalisation
(Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013), they still support generous welfare states. A second group
of RRPP supporters can be described as being more middle class and therefore driven
less by low status than by fear of losing status. However, since welfare state institutions
are also designed to moderate negative life trajectories, for example after job loss, we
would also expect positive attitudes among the middle class towards the welfare state.
These arguments can be underlined once again with comparative data from the 2014
European Election Study (Schmitt et al., 2016).6 On average, 50% of RRPP supporters
are in favour of redistribution from the rich to the poor. Although there are diﬀerences
between countries (from 35% in Denmark to 72% in Greece), a look at this typical indi-
cator of pro welfare-state attitudes clearly underlines that a signiﬁcant proportion of RRPP
supporters have left-wing attitudes when it comes to the economic conﬂict dimension.
This connects very well to Röth et al. (2018, p. 345) who state that ‘the working-class con-
stituency of PRRPs makes it diﬃcult for these parties to openly support welfare
retrenchment.’
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Summarising these points, it seems reasonable for competing parties to react to the
success of RRPPs not only by adapting cultural or EU issue positions but also by shifting
their economic positions to the left, more precisely their stances towards the welfare state.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Parties react to the success of RRPPs by shifting their policy positions on welfare-state
issues to the left.
It may, however, be that not all non-RRPPs respond to the success of RRPPs by shifting
their policy positions to the same extent. Given the uniform trends toward welfare state
retrenchment in Western Europe since the 1990s, it seems plausible that economically
left parties have more to gain by shifting their stance towards pro-welfare state positions
than parties on the right. Such a reﬁnement of our ﬁrst hypothesis is supported by the
issue-ownership theory (Petrocik, 1996), party competence ascription (Budge & Farlie,
1983) as well as party-speciﬁc association with certain macro-economic policy goals
(Hibbs, 1977). In addition to ideological factors, strategic decisions by parties are also
inﬂuenced by how they are perceived by citizens; a positive and coherent association
should help them win votes. Following this line of thought, there are at least three
aspects that suggest that economically left parties should should change their position
more than economically right parties: Firstly, long-term programmatic commitment to
welfare-related issues characterises the majority of left-of-centre parties. Voters consider
them not only as serious actors in these policy areas, but also as the most competent
problem-solvers for social justice issues (Seeberg, 2017). On this basis, left parties have
a strategic advantage in competing for votes with RRPPs on the socio-economic dimen-
sion. Voters are likely to choose left parties over RRPPs based on their ownership advan-
tage. Moreover, neoliberal policies have disillusioned especially supporters of left-of-centre
parties, as these parties – driven by oﬃce-seeking goals – appealed to centrist voters at the
expense of the working class (Karreth, Polk, & Allen, 2013). Returning to more pro-
welfare stances could be a fruitful strategy for these parties to win back voters by regaining
ideological coherence.
Secondly, defusing the salience of dividing issues such as immigration during election
campaigns could possibly play to the electoral advantage of left-of-centre parties (Bale,
Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2010). Position-shifting on the welfare issue
could not only reduce the relevance of the core issues of RRPPs but also increase the
importance of the welfare issue in public and party-internal debates. With such a
renewed focus on their core issues, left-of-centre parties can thus stick to their guns.
Finally, economically left parties and RRPPs compete for overlapping voter segments
(see also Figure 1). In connection with their above-mentioned attractiveness to so-called
‘losers of globalisation,’ RRPPs are increasingly gaining support from left-authoritarian
voters, i.e. voters who favour redistributive policies in the economic realm, but also
hold conservative stances when it comes to cultural issues (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al.,
2006). Although these voters tend to be aﬃliated with the economic left in times when
cultural issues are less relevant, they are likely to vote for RRPPs once these do become
more crucial (Lefkofridi, Wagner, & Willmann, 2014). Promoting pro-welfare stances
and increasing their relevance in the public debate improves the chances of economically
left parties to win back these left-authoritarian voters.
On the basis of these considerations, we can formulate a second hypothesis:
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H2: Parties on the left react to the success of RRPPs by shifting their policy positions on
welfare state issues more to the left than parties on the right.
Building on previous research and these theoretical considerations, our study makes
several signiﬁcant contributions by testing these hypotheses with longitudinal data for a
large number of Western European democracies. First, we test whether the success of
RRPPs changes the competitive behaviour of non-RRPPs beyond the area of immigration
policies. Such an approach also implies a more explicit consideration of the (at least) two-
dimensional nature of political competition. Second, previous studies have limited their
considerations to the responses of mainstream parties, thus excluding other relevant
parties. Our theoretical argument applies to all parties in a party system; we test whether
Western European party systems as such are aﬀected by the surge of RRPPs. Third, this
analysis also looks at the broader literature concerned with the impact of niche parties in
general. It shows that the parties’ responses to the rise of challenger parties are not
unidimensional, but that the parties – depending on the conﬁguration of the political
space, previous programmatic commitment, and the programmatic appeals of the challen-
ger party – choose diﬀerent strategies to deal with processes of voter dealignment.
Data and methods
To test our hypotheses, we need longitudinal, cross-national measures of parties’ stances
on welfare-related issues. We use data from the MARPOR group (Volkens et al., 2018),
which includes almost all democratic elections in Western Europe since the Second
World War. This dataset provides party positions based on the coding of manifestos pub-
lished by the parties in the run-up to national parliamentary elections.7 Each quasi-sen-
tence of these manifestos was assigned to one of 56 predeﬁned categories. Building on
this, the proportion of quasi-sentences relating to one of these categories was determined.
To transform these frequency scores into positional values, we rely on logit-transformed
scales as proposed by Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov, and Laver (2011).
To construct the welfare scale, we use policy categories that relate directly to govern-
ment services. More speciﬁcally, we use the items ‘per504: Welfare State Expansion’ and
‘per506: Education Expansion’ as leftist categories. The items ‘per505: Welfare State Limit-
ation’ and ‘per507: Education Limitation’ represent rightist categories.8
Our main explanatory variable is the vote share a RRPP has gained prior to the drafting
of the manifesto in question. To identify RRPPs, we rely on party selections from previous
studies (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018; Han, 2015; van Spanje, 2010).
This selection is largely similar to those parties that Mudde (2007) classiﬁed as populist
or nativist. To identify RRPPs’ electoral support in national elections, we use data provided
by the research unit ‘Democracy and Democratization’ at the WZB Berlin Social Science
Center. We have replaced the missing data after consulting national election commissions.
We consider only the vote share of the strongest RRPP per election (see Table A1 in the
appendix).
We use information from the MARPOR project to identify economically left-of-centre
and right-of-centre parties. More precisely, we use the left-right scores of the parties,
which represent left-right placements in a primarily socio-economic deﬁnition. In a
ﬁrst step, we calculate country-speciﬁc averages of this variable using weighted (by vote
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share) party values.9 In a second step, we calculate the average left-right scores for each
party. Finally, the party-speciﬁc means are compared with the country-speciﬁc means.
As smaller values on the left-right scale refer to more leftist positions, parties with
mean values below the country average are coded as left-of-centre parties. Correspond-
ingly, values above the country average result in a ‘right-of-centre’ classiﬁcation.
We add several control variables to reduce the risk of spurious correlations. We control
for the positions of non-RRPPs on cultural protectionism. To this end, we again rely on
the data provided by the MARPOR group and the rescaling procedure described above.
Using the items ‘per607: Multiculturalism Positive’ and ‘per608: Multiculturalism Nega-
tive’, the positions of non-RRPPs are constructed. Furthermore, previous research has
shown that party size and government status inﬂuence parties’ responses to competition
(Carmines & Stimson, 1986; Riker, 1993; van de Wardt, 2015).
In addition, we control for macroeconomic indicators that could inﬂuence the strategic
positioning of parties in terms of welfare. In this context, we control for the unemploy-
ment rate (Teorell et al., 2018), the immigration rate,10 GDP per capita (World Bank,
2016), and the respective country’s GINI-score (Solt, 2016). For all these variables, we
use the value one year before the election, since party manifestos are usually written
before or at the beginning of election campaigns. Ultimately, shifts in public opinion
are likely to drive parties’ strategic decisions and thus constitute a potential disruptive
factor when observing a relationship between RRPP success and the positional responses
of other parties. Unfortunately, public opinion data either cover only a small part of the
time period under study or lacks reliable items for measuring public attitudes to the
welfare state. For this reason, we add the ideological centre of gravity (Gross & Sigelman,
1984) to the regression equation to control for broader public opinion trends regarding
socio-economic positions.
In total, our analysis covers elections in 18 Western European countries since 1985.11
After adding all independent variables to the model, our dataset comprises 183 non-
RRPPs in 128 elections. The combinations of parties and elections result in 670 cases.
We include all non-RRPPs in Western Europe, with the exception of special-issue and
small regionalist parties, which are likely to respond diﬀerently to nation-wide challenges.
It is important to note that not all elections or even countries have a competing RRPP.
However, elections or countries that do not have competing RRPPs are not excluded
from the analyses as they provide relevant information on policy changes of non-
RRPPs based on our control variables and general trends during our research period.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (N = 670).
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Welfare position −3.766 1.811 −7.933 1.735
RRPP vote share 5.775 6.921 0.000 28.377
Cultural protectionism −0.839 1.678 −4.812 4.291
Party size 15.590 12.612 0.000 52.512
Government 0.399 0 1
Unemployment rate 7.495 4.275 0.800 24.440
Immigration rate (log) 1.599 0.954 −1.828 3.612
GDP per capita (log) 10.302 0.550 8.453 11.647
GINI 27.393 3.872 20.800 35.200
Centre of gravity −0.214 0.400 −1.823 0.882
Right-of-centre party 0.422 0 1
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By deﬁnition, the variable measuring RRPP vote share is set to 0 for all these elections and
countries. Table 1 provides the corresponding summary statistics for all variables.
We specify OLS regression models to evaluate whether RRPPs’ vote shares impact the
positions of other parties on welfare issues. Although party manifestos are not written
from scratch but are based on positions promoted in the past, neither the Breusch–
Godfrey test statistics nor the Durbin-Watson test statistics indicate that serial correlation
is a problem.12 We add party-ﬁxed eﬀects to deal with party-speciﬁc heterogeneity. More-
over, we use election-clustered standard errors to avoid problems arising from possible
correlations of error terms across observations, i.e. election-speciﬁc factors that could
inﬂuence the positions of all parties competing in an election (Rogers, 1983; Williams,
2000). Despite the panel structure of the data, the use of panel-corrected standard
errors (Beck & Katz, 1995) is inappropriate because the data are highly unbalanced and
the number of parties exceeds the number of time units (election periods).13
Findings: The impact of radical right populist party success on the welfare
stances of rival parties
Are parties responding to the success of RRPPs by shifting their socio-economic positions
to more pro-welfare state stances? If so, is this eﬀect more pronounced among the left-of-
centre parties? In Table 2, Model 1 shows the relationship between the positions of non-
RRPPs and RRPP vote share while only controlling for party characteristics. In line with
Hypothesis 1, RRPP vote share has a negative eﬀect on the dependent variable, implying
that the more successful RRPPs have been at the ballot box, the more parties promote
Table 2. The impact of RRPPs’ vote shares on the positions of non-RRPPs on welfare.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
RRPP vote share −0.047**
(0.021)
−0.043**
(0.020)
−0.062***
(0.020)
Cultural protectionism 0.120**
(0.050)
0.118**
(0.047)
0.112**
(0.046)
Party size −0.034**
(0.016)
−0.032**
(0.015)
−0.030**
(0.015)
Government 0.380***
(0.132)
0.356**
(0.145)
0.345**
(0.145)
Unemployment rate 0.074**
(0.031)
0.073**
(0.032)
Immigration rate −0.010
(0.191)
−0.007
(0.192)
GDP per capita −0.068
(0.283)
−0.073
(0.285)
GINI −0.038
(0.074)
−0.036
(0.075)
Centre of gravity 1.017***
(0.241)
1.014***
(0.242)
RRPP vote * Right-of-centre 0.050**
(0.025)
Constant −2.949***
(0.620)
−1.631
(2.792)
−1.594
(2.798)
Party ﬁxed eﬀects √ √ √
Election SE clustering √ √ √
N 670 670 670
Adj. R-squared 0.448 0.509 0.511
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
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supportive stances on welfare. This eﬀect persists across all models shown in Table 2. The
coeﬃcient of cultural protectionism indicates a positive eﬀect on the dependent variable.
Hence, parties show a more restrictive programmatic proﬁle on immigration if they also
promote less supportive attitudes towards welfare. However, the eﬀect size is rather small.
A party’s vote share has a negative impact – political parties promote more leftist positions
on welfare the larger they are Government participation has also a signiﬁcant impact –
political parties take more rightist positions on welfare if they take part in government.
Political parties, once in oﬃce and confronted with the constraints of budgetary questions,
thus promote less favorable welfare stances.
Model 2 adds controls related to macroeconomic trends, immigration ﬁgures, and
public opinion. The unemployment rate shows a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the dependent vari-
able. The eﬀect is positive, suggesting that parties are less supportive of welfare as the
national unemployment rate rises. Increasing unemployment rates may indicate excessive
demand for welfare services in the near future, which cannot be met by many of the
increasingly globalised national economies in our sample. Interestingly, we ﬁnd no signiﬁ-
cant impact of GDP per capita or the GINI coeﬃcient on the welfare-state positions of
parties. Policy shifts also do not seem to have anything to do with changes of the immi-
gration rate. Moreover, parties’ policy positions are inﬂuenced by changes in the ideologi-
cal centre of gravity of the respective party system. Here, a one-unit change is associated
with a similar change in the position of a single party. Concerning our main variable of
interest, the eﬀect of RRPP vote share on welfare positions of non-RRPPs remains negative
and signiﬁcant even if we control for this variety of possible disruptive factors. Model 2
thus provides strong empirical support for Hypothesis 1.
Finally, Model 3 tests whether left-of-centre parties are more inclined to respond to the
success of RRPPs by promoting pro-welfare positions (Hypothesis 2). For this purpose, we
have interacted the RRPP vote share with a binary indicator that distinguishes between
Figure 2. Marginal eﬀects plot.
Note: The error bars indicate 90% conﬁdence intervals.
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economically left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties.14 The results conﬁrm our theoreti-
cal expectations. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level, indicating that leftist and rightist parties indeed diﬀer in their
reactions to the electoral success of RRPPs. Figure 2 shows the corresponding marginal
eﬀects plot to facilitate interpretation. As expected, the eﬀect for left-of-centre parties is,
negative and the whiskers show that this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant. In comparison,
the estimate for right-of-centre parties is also negative but much smaller and the whiskers
include the zero line. These results thus provide empirical support for Hypothesis 2: Only
economic left-of-centre parties respond to increasing public support for RRPPs by adjust-
ing their positions in favour of pro-welfare stances. While all non-RRPPs tend to shift their
welfare-state positions to the left, taking into account all other factors, there seems to be
more variance when it comes to parties on the right, while parties on the left react more
uniformly to the loss of parts of their core constituencies. Therefore, back to our ﬁrst
hypothesis, the general eﬀect we ﬁnd is driven primarily by left-of-centre parties.
To illustrate the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between parties on the left and right, consider
the following example. A right-of-centre party tends to shift – ceteris paribus – by .12
points towards the pro-welfare pole if a radical right party increases its vote share by
10% points. In comparison to this, a left-of-centre party moves .62 points toward the
left in the same scenario. The reaction of centre-left-parties is thus ﬁve times larger
than the response of right-of-centre parties. Such a shift is equal to one third of the stan-
dard deviation of the dependent variable and equals half the distance between the British
Labour Party and the Conservative Party in the 2015 general election in the United
Kingdom. Based on this, we can conclude that the eﬀect of RRPPs on welfare-state
policy shifts is quite substantial –especially consistent with our second hypothesis.
Several robustness checks support the validity of our ﬁndings.15 For example, jackknife
analyses show that neither a single country nor a speciﬁc party family drives the results.
However, we ﬁnd that the interaction term is no longer signiﬁcant if the conservative/
Christian democratic or the social democratic party family is excluded from the analysis
(see Figure A4 in the appendix). Although this does not aﬀect the substantial interpret-
ation of our results, it suggests that the diﬀerence between left-of-centre and right-of-
centre parties is to some extent driven by these two party families.
Conclusions
The statement that the electoral successes of RRPPs fundamentally change or even threa-
ten Western European democracies is probably an exaggeration. However, they do aﬀect
various elements of representative democracy, including political competition and its
spatial logic. RRPPs do this not only directly in the rare cases where they have been or
are in government. They also have an indirect eﬀect by inﬂuencing the programmatic
strategies of non-RRPPs. This eﬀect has been shown for mainstream parties and especially
for the core issues of RRPPs, which belong to the increasingly important socio-cultural
conﬂict dimension. However, political competition takes place in a two-dimensional
space in which the second dimension refers to the traditional left-right socio-economic
conﬂict. Consequently, the reactions of non-RRPPs to the rise of RRPPs with the aim
of preventing further vote loss and re-attracting voters do not have to be limited to the
socio-cultural dimension. Since RRPPs cater to the (self-perceived) ‘losers of
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globalization,’ which includes an economic connotation, we should not only expect non-
RRPPs to adjust positions on the classical left-right dimension, but also to try to attract the
lower strata of society through the promotion of more expansive welfare. This eﬀect, we
argued, should be stronger for economically left-of-centre parties.
Based on time-series analyses of a wide range of parties and countries in Western Europe
from 1985 to the present, our ﬁndings indeed show that the electoral success of RRPPs leads
all other parties in the party system to take more pro-welfare positions. However, there is a
substantial diﬀerence between left- and right-of-centre parties, which corresponds to our
second hypothesis. Economically left-of-centre parties shift more strongly to pro-welfare
positions when confronted with successful RRPPs than right-of-centre parties. We attribute
this diﬀerence primarily to diﬀerences in issue ownership and to characteristics of core con-
stituents, both of which deﬁne plausible and potentially successful programmatic responses
to RRPPs. These eﬀects are robust even if we control for a set of other factors or apply
alternative model speciﬁcations. Hence, the empirical analysis conﬁrms both of our hypoth-
eses. In contrast to the literature review of Muis and Immerzeel (2017, p. 918f.), which found
that RRPPs inﬂuence other parties only in terms of their core socio-cultural issues, we
present strong evidence that competing parties also react by adjusting their political pos-
itions beyond migration politics.
It is possible that apart from the distinction between economic left-of-centre and right-
of-centre parties, other diﬀerences between parties play an equally important role when
explaining parties’ responses to the success of the radical right. So far, research has high-
lighted that strategic responses to challenger success vary between challenger, government
and opposition parties or between those parties losing or winning votes (e.g. Abou-Chadi,
2016; van de Wardt, 2015). We have reviewed the data for such alternative interaction
eﬀects, but there appears to be no signiﬁcant conditional relationship between these vari-
ables and RRPP success.16 However, there is clearly room for future, more ﬁne-grained
studies that build on our approach and ﬁndings.
What are the implications of these ﬁndings? Obviously, research on RRPPs is highly en
vogue, resulting in a massive increase in publications. However, as we show in this study, it
makes sense to go beyond the traditional research paths deﬁned by the core features of the
object of analyses, namely RRPPs’ issue emphasis on nativist policy positions. This can be
achieved, for example, by linking more general theories and research on elections, parties
and voters with RRPP-speciﬁc research questions. We show that the impact of RRPPs on
political competition is underestimated when research focuses only on the socio-cultural
issue dimension. In fact, non-RRPPs also react on the socio-economic dimension of pol-
itical competition. Therefore, future research should apply a two-dimensional rather than
a one-dimensional logic to analysing the impact of RRPPs. Moreover, we see that the
inﬂuence of RRPPs goes beyond the group of (centrist) mainstream parties. RRPPs are
contagious for the whole party system and therefore even drive policy shifts of smaller
and non-centrist parties. It remains to be seen whether these pro-welfare shifts will
indeed help (especially leftist) parties to win back votes lost to RRPPs.
We have shown that not only research on parties’ strategic responses to the success
of RRPPs, but also on the consequences of these strategies needs to develop more
complex theoretical arguments. This would allow us to point to more indirect eﬀects of
RRPPs – not only on political competition and party systems, but also on more general
characteristics of representative democracies. Although, pro-welfare shifts of party
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systems may be a positive trend in the face of increasing socio-economic inequalities and
their dysfunctional consequences for democracies (Merkel, 2018), it may not be a price
worth paying if it depends on the rise of the radical right and its negative eﬀects on
liberal democracy and pluralist societies.
Notes
1. We apply a broad deﬁnition of RRPPs covering both right-wing populist and nativist parties.
Therefore, our set of parties is very similar to the one identiﬁed by Mudde (2007) or other
studies on policy shifts due to the electoral success of RRPPs. A complete list of parties
deﬁned as RRPPs can be found in the appendix (Table A1).
2. The complex issue of the EU is linked to both the economic and the cultural-conﬂict dimen-
sions (e.g., Kriesi et al., 2008) and – with regard to Western Europe – the respective strengths
of these links clearly depend on factors such as actual membership of a country or the intro-
duction of the common currency. This is also reﬂected in the overall salience of EU issues for
diﬀerent RRPPs and how they are framed by them. We have therefore chosen to apply a two-
dimensional deﬁnition of political competition in this paper.
3. While we agree that measuring welfare-chauvinism on the basis of CMP codes is quite
diﬃcult, it is not convincing to simply multiply positions on welfare state issues by positions
on multiculturalism. This approach does not allow us to verify whether statements on the two
issues in the manifestos are actually linked. Moreover, the study does not provide much
information on the authors’ estimation approach. It seems, however, that the models do
not control for the peculiar cross-sectional-time-series data structure beyond adding a
lagged dependent variable. Therefore, standard errors can be strongly biased as there is no
control for existing clusters (by party over time, of parties in elections, of parties in countries,
etc.). We present a more transparent and state-of-the-art approach as an additional contri-
bution to the literature.
4. In fact, this study does not evaluate the (potential) success of the strategic decisions of non-
RRPPs. However, we develop arguments as to why speciﬁc responses to the socio-economic
dimension are plausible strategies from the perspective of political parties to win back votes
from RRPPs and put them to an empirical test.
5. Results are based on averages of all Western democracies with at least one RRPP. Further
information on our approach can be found in the appendix.
6. A detailed description of our approach can be found in the appendix.
7. It should be noted that the MARPOR group applies speciﬁc rules on whether a party com-
peting in an election is included in the dataset, how to deal with electoral alliances and other
speciﬁc features of countries or elections (Volkens et al., 2018). As a result, the set of parties
available for inclusion is limited by the MARPOR dataset at hand. However, since the
inclusion criteria of the MARPOR team are mainly based on relevance (in terms of
winning seats in an election), we are conﬁdent that our empirical analyses are not problema-
tically biased.
8. The results of the regression analysis remain stable if we estimate the welfare positions of
mainstream parties using only the items ‘per405: Welfare State Expansion’ and ‘per505:
Welfare State Limitation’ (see Table A4 and Figure A1 in the Appendix).
9. In order to obtain averages that are also meaningful for the early elections under analysis, we
use all available data from 1970 to the present for this calculation. We also re-run all analyses
while assigning left and right parties using a purely economic scale. The results remain sub-
stantially identical to those presented.
10. The migration rate is calculated as the log-value of the inﬂow of foreign population divided
by the total population. Migration data was derived from the OECD International Migration
Database (OECD, 2011) and the population statistics are provided by Eurostat (2015).
11. Countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
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Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The period under research is deﬁned by a substantive
as well as a practical argument. On the one hand, before the mid-1980s only a few RRPPs
started to gain signiﬁcant electoral support. On the other hand, limitations on data avail-
ability (e.g. the immigration rate) also deﬁne the time period under investigation.
12. The results are robust to correcting for potential serial correlation by either adding a lagged
dependent variable to the regression or applying a Prais-Winsten regression. The corre-
sponding results can be found in the appendix.
13. The results of the empirical analysis are robust to alternative model speciﬁcations and the
inclusion of additional covariates. Detailed information on these robustness tests can be
found in the appendix.
14. As explained, e.g., byWooldridge (2010, pp. 300–4), the models presented in this table do not
include a constituent term for the intra-case time-constant variable ‘right-of-centre.’
However, as this deviates from common model set-ups, we also present our main model
and the corresponding marginal eﬀects plot based on party-demeaned values and a constitu-
ent term in the appendix (Table A2). This has no eﬀect on our ﬁndings.
15. The corresponding results can be found in the appendix.
16. Indeed, the distinction between left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties seems to be one of
the main factors conditioning the impact of RRPP success on the welfare positions of other
parties. We have tested whether party size, government participation, or being a challenger
party conditions the response of a party to increasing electoral support for RRPPs. To avoid
the use of three-way interaction terms, we have estimated models for all parties as well as for
left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties separately. See Table A7 in the appendix for the full
regression results. It is important to note that our main ﬁndings are conﬁrmed in all of these
alternative models. Therefore, in all these cases, the marginal impact of RRPP vote share on
the welfare positions of left-of-centre parties remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure A5 illustrates this for the interaction between party size and RRPP vote share in
the case of left-of-centre parties.
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